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NOTE
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of
Chicago: A Defining Case for the Substantial
Burden Test Under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act
NOELLE V. CRISALLI*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1 The First
Amendment protects the most basic and coveted rights of all per-
sons in the United States. Among them are the rights to free
speech, assembly, association, petition, press, and religion. 2 Relig-
ious freedom is protected by two clauses in the First Amend-
ment-the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.3
A strict interpretation of the two clauses can seem inconsistent;4
however, in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York, the Supreme
Court established that there is "play in the joints" between these
two clauses for some regulation by the Congress and state legisla-
tures.5 Land use laws, along with the Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act, are laws that fall within the joints.
* Special thanks to Professors John Nolon and Jessica Bacher of the Land Use
Law Center at Pace University School of Law and to Professor Michael Mushlin, Pace
University School of Law, for their encouragement and assistance with this casenote.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
5. Id. at 669 ("The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all
that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally
established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those ex-
pressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of
a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsor-
ship and without interference.") (emphasis added).
263
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The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA)6 was passed by Congress and signed into law by Presi-
dent Clinton on September 22, 2000. 7 It was passed in response to
a long line of First Amendment cases and a congressional law that
altered the level of scrutiny laws received when faced with a chal-
lenge under the Free Exercise Clause.8 This casenote discusses
RLUIPA and its application in the case of the Civil Liberties for
Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, (C.L. U.B.).9 It argues that the
Seventh Circuit, in C.L. U.B., applied the correct interpretation of
the substantial burden test under RLUIPA. Before discussing
C.L. U.B. in Part II of this casenote, a brief history of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence surrounding the Establishment Clause, Free
Exercise Clause, and the invalidation of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) is provided. Part III of this casenote dis-
cusses RLUIPA. Part IV reviews C.L. U.B. and argues that, in de-
ciding C.L. U.B., the Seventh Circuit established the proper
interpretation of the substantial burden test under RLUIPA. Fi-
nally, Part V discusses how other courts are either following suit
behind the Seventh Circuit by adopting a narrow interpretation of
the substantial burden test or departing from the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit and adopting a broad view of the substantial bur-
den test. Part V also illustrates the practical effects of broad and
narrow interpretations of the substantial burden test and dis-
cusses the implications of RLUIPA beyond the First Amendment.
6. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (2000).
7. William John Kearns, Jr., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act: Impact of Statute on Local Zoning Regulations and on the Operation of Prisons
and Jails, Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education 21st An-
nual Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation Seminar (May 1-2, 2003), available at 2003
WL 22002105, at *3.
8. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (articulating a strict scrutiny
standard to apply to Free Exercise claims); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(reaffirming the Sherbert strict scrutiny test); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (reversing the SherbertlYoder strict scrutiny standard of review and im-
posing a rational basis standard of review on Free Exercise claims that challenge
neutral laws of general applicability); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000) (originally enacted in 1993) (restoring the Sherberti
Yoder strict scrutiny standard to Free Exercise claims); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down RFRA as unconstitutional as applied to the states as
beyond the scope of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
9. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago (C.L.U.B.), 342 F.3d 752
(7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1096 (2004).
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION
ACT
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which was made applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 protects individual relig-
ious freedom in two ways: It protects the individual from the es-
tablishment of a religion by the state,"' and it protects the rights
of an individual to exercise his or her religion free of undue gov-
ernment intervention. 12 Between these two protections, however,
there is room for some government regulation of religion. 13 The
question, then, is how much regulation is allowed? The pursuit of
the answer to this question has left us with a rich body of constitu-
tional law discussed briefly below.' 4
The longstanding test to determine whether a law violates the
Establishment Clause was first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.15 Under the
Lemon test, a law will be upheld under the Establishment Clause
if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) is neutral toward religion, and
(3) does not cause excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion.' 6 Contemplation of the Lemon test in the context of RLUIPA
is important when considering the level of protection that
RLUIPA provides for religious entities. If RLUIPA provides pro-
tection to religious land uses beyond that which is provided to
10. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion'
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another . . .force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion .... Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.'") (citation
omitted); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental con-
cept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guar-
anteed by the First Amendment."). See also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, 5
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 21.1 (3d ed. 1999).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. Id.
13. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
14. For a comprehensive discussion of the United States Supreme Court's First
Amendment Jurisprudence under the religion clauses, see ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra
note 10, §§ 21.1-.16.
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. Id. at 612-613.
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other land uses, rather than merely placing religious land uses on
equal footing, then RLUIPA will likely violate the neutrality
prong of the Lemon test.17
The constitutional test that courts apply when they are re-
quired to decide whether a law violates the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment has not been as clear as the Establish-
ment Clause's Lemon test. In spite of this, the cases of Sherbert v.
Verner'8 and Wisconsin v. Yoder' 9 offer a good starting point for
the discussion of the test courts should apply when faced with a
Free Exercise claim. In Sherbert, the Court articulated a two-part
strict scrutiny test to determine whether a law violates an individ-
ual's Free Exercise rights.20 First, the plaintiff must establish
that the law imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise. 21
After the plaintiff meets this burden, the government must then
show a compelling interest to justify that burden on the plaintiffs
right to free exercise. 22 The Court reinforced this test in Yoder
when it said, "only those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion."23
The case of Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, however, undid this approach.24 In Smith, the
Supreme Court of the United States considered whether "the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of Ore-
gon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of
its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug .... -25 The
petitioners in Smith were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote
during a religious ceremony. At the time, the use of peyote was
prohibited under Oregon's drug laws.26 When the petitioners
tried to claim unemployment benefits from the state, their claim
17. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 188-90 (2d
Cir. 2004).
18. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
19. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
20. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 10, § 21.8.
21. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; see also id.
22. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406; see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 21.8.
23. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; see also Scott David Godshall, Land Use Regulation
and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1562, 1572-73 (1984). (At the time
this article was written, the SherbertiYoder test was controlling on Free Exercise
claims. This article discusses the cases together and the test that they articulate.)
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
25. Id. at 874.
26. Id.
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was denied because they were fired for work-related misconduct. 27
The Court held that the Oregon prohibition of sacramental peyote
use could survive a constitutional challenge under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 28 Moreover, Smith established that "valid and neu-
tral laws of general applicability" that have an incidental effect of
burdening religion are evaluated using rational basis scrutiny.29
Strict scrutiny still applies, however, if the action is a "hybrid"
action combining a Free Exercise claim with another constitu-
tional claim, or if the law is not a neutral law of general applicabil-
ity-in other words, if the law is targeted at religion. 30 Some
commentators have argued that Smith does not apply to land use
laws because land use laws, by nature, are not neutral laws of
general applicability.31 However, courts seem to disagree and
have applied Smith in zoning and landmark preservation cases. 32
In response to Smith, Congress took action and passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).33 Through RFRA,
Congress explicitly sought to restore the strict scrutiny test ar-
ticulated in Sherbert and Yoder to laws that were challenged as
violative of the Free Exercise Clause. To avoid confusion regard-
ing its intention, Congress clearly stated, "[tihe purposes of this
act are-U) to restore the compelling interest test set forth in Sher-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 893.
29. Id. at 879-85.
30. Id. at 881 ("The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amend-
ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of
the press .... ") (citations omitted); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or
not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the
commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must ad-
vance 'interests of the highest order' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those
interests.") (citations omitted).
31. See Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitu-
tional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929 (2001); Catherine Maxson, "Their
Preservation is Our Sacred Trust"-Judicially Mandated Free Exercise Exemptions to
Historic Preservation Ordinances under Employment Division v. Smith, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 205 (2003); Sara Smolik, Note, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was it a
Waste?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723 (2004).
32. See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, ZONING AND PLANNING DESKBOOK § 7:46 (2d ed. 2001);
C.L.U. v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying Smith to
a Free Exercise challenge of a zoning law); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New
York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying Smith to a Free Exercise challenge of a
landmark preservation law).
33. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4.
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bert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its applica-
tion in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened., 34
In reestablishing strict scrutiny review of Free Exercise
claims, Congress relied on its enforcement powers in section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment to make RFRA applicable to the
states. 35 RFRA was short lived, however, and the Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores36 struck down RFRA as applied to the states. The
Court held that RFRA was beyond the scope of authority granted
to Congress in section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 In
response, Congress passed RLUIPA, a more refined and narrow
form of RFRA.38
II. THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
A. The Provisions of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act
In the eloquent words of Judge Pallmeyer of the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois:
Few principles are more venerable or more passionately held in
American society than those of local control over land use and
the right to assemble and worship where one chooses. On occa-
sion, these principles conflict, and the right to assemble in a lo-
cation of choice must be balanced against the need of a city to
continue to grow economically, to provide adequate municipal
services to its residents, and to continue to attract businesses
and consumers. 39
RLUIPA, through its special consideration of the burdens that
state and municipal laws place on religion, seeks to address the
important issue articulated by Judge Pallmeyer. RLUIPA was in-
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
35. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).
36. Id. at 531.
37. Id. It is worth mentioning that RFRA is still valid as applied to the federal
government. The Court in City of Boerne held that Congress exceeded its authority
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA and enforcing its
provisions on the states. Id. Under article I, section 8, of the United States Constitu-
tion, however, Congress has the authority to apply RFRA to the federal government.
KMIEC, supra note 32, § 7.46 n.50.
38. See Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 31, at 943-46.
39. Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 963 (2003).
268 [Vol. 23
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss1/10
2005-2006] CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR URBAN BELIEVERS 269
troduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate on
July 13, 2000.4 0 RLUIPA was virtually unopposed, and Congress
passed the Act pursuant to its authority under the Commerce
Clause, the Spending Clause, and section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment 4' on July 26, 2000.42 President Clinton signed
RLUIPA into law on September 22, 2000. 43 RLUIPA is comprised
of two prominent sections. The first is the land use provision,44
and the second is the institutionalized persons provision.45 The
land use provision of RLUIPA states that:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation
in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person . . . unless the government demonstrates
that . . . the burden . . . (A) is in furtherance of a compelling
government interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest. 46
Furthermore, the land use provision of RLUIPA requires the gov-
ernment to treat religious land uses on equal terms with non-re-
ligious land uses.47 RLUIPA also prohibits the government from
discriminating against institutions on the basis of religion or relig-
ious denomination. 48 Finally, RLUIPA precludes the government
from totally excluding or unreasonably limiting religious land
uses from a jurisdiction. 49 For the purposes of RLUIPA, the gov-
ernment defines the term "land use regulation" as "a zoning or
landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant's use or development of land . . . ."50 Under
RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of persuasion and is
40. Kearns, supra note 7, at 3.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
45. Id. § 2000cc-1. Although an in-depth discussion of the institutionalized per-
sons provision is beyond the scope of this article, this clause prohibits the government
from imposing a substantial burden on the religious exercise of persons residing in or
confined to an institution without furthering a compelling government interest
through the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. Id. This provision
has been invoked most often by persons confined in prisons. See, e.g., Mayweathers v.
Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir.
2003).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 2000cc(b)(1).
48. Id. § 2000cc(b)(2).
49. Id. § 2000cc(b)(3)(A)-(B).
50. Id. § 2000cc-5(5).
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required to show that the government has imposed a substantial
burden on plaintiffs exercise of religion.51 After the plaintiff
meets this burden, the government then has the burden of proving
that the restriction placed on religious land use furthers a compel-
ling government interest and the regulation is the least restrictive
means of achieving that compelling interest.52
The C.L.U.B. case, citing RLUIPA's legislative history, indi-
cates that the substantial burden standard under RLUIPA is a
codification of existing First Amendment jurisprudence. 53 Indeed,
one can infer from the language of the statute that RLUIPA was
meant as a codification of existing First Amendment jurispru-
dence. 54 RLUIPA does, however, make one clear break with tradi-
tional First Amendment jurisprudence in that it defines religious
exercise in broader terms than prior definitions of religious exer-
cise.55 Under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, relig-
ious exercise was narrowly defined as activities that were central
to religious practice, or actions that were compelled by a relig-
ion.56 Under RLUIPA, religious exercise is defined to include not
only activities central to religious practice, but also "[t]he use,
building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious
exercise... [if the] person or entity that uses or intends to use the
property [uses the property] for that purpose."57 It is precisely be-
cause of this break with traditional First Amendment jurispru-
dence that a narrow view of the substantial burden standard is
required.58 RLUIPA is only implicated when a law rises to the
51. Id. § 2000cc-2(b).
52. Id.
53. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The term
'substantial burden' as used in this Act is not intended to be given any broader inter-
pretation than the Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of substantial burden
or religious exercise." (quoting 146 CONG. REC. 7774-01, 7776 (2000))).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
55. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B), with C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 760-61 (citing
various prior cases defining religious practice including Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) ("religious exercise as 'the observation of a
central religious belief or practice") (citation omitted)).
56. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 760-61 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 ("religious exer-
cise as adherence to the central precepts of a religion"), Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 ("re-
ligious exercise as behavior and beliefs compelled by a particular religion"), and
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699 ("religious exercise as 'the observation of a central relig-
ious belief or practice'")).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B).
58. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 761.
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level of imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise. 59 In
several cases, even where there is a law in place that may limit
the use of land for a religious purpose, RLUIPA will not be appli-
cable if the law is not found to substantially burden religion. 60
B. The Constitutionality of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act
Although there has been a vigorous debate about the facial
constitutionality of RLUIPA,61 a recent decision by the United
States Supreme Court may have quieted the debate.62 In Cutter v.
Wilkinson, the United States Supreme Court upheld the institu-
tionalized persons provision of RLUIPA as constitutionally valid
on its face under the Establishment Clause. 63 In so doing, the
unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Ginsburg, reasoned
that RLUIPA, on its face, merely "alleviates exceptional govern-
ment-created burdens on private religious exercise."6 4 Despite the
fact that Cutter was a case brought under the institutionalized
persons provision, its result is likely to extend to facial challenges
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). See also Wendie L. Kellington, Historical Evolution of
RLUIPA, Land Use Institute: Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and
Compensation, American Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education (Aug. 26-28, 2004), available at SK002 ALI-ABA 797.
60. See, e.g., San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that the City of Morgan Hill's zoning ordinance did not impose a
substantial burden on religion and adopting the substantial burden standard articu-
lated by the Seventh Circuit in C.L. U.B); Konikov v. Orange County, 302 F. Supp. 2d
1328 (M.D. Fl. 2004) (adopting the substantial burden test articulated by the Seventh
Circuit in C.L.U.B. and granting the defendant-county's motion for summary judg-
ment on the plaintiffs claim that a county zoning ordinance violated RLUIPA because
the zoning ordinance did not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise).
61. Compare Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 31 (arguing that RLUIPA is con-
stitutional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the
Spending Clause, and the Establishment Clause), and Shawn Jensvold, Comment,
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid
Exercise of Congressional Power?, 16 BYU J. PuB. L. 1 (2001) (arguing that RLUIPA
is constitutional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), with Joshua R. Gel-
ler, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: An Unconstitu-
tional Exercise of Congress's Power Under Section Five of The Fourteenth Amendment,
6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 561 (2002/2003) (arguing that RLUIPA is unconstitu-
tional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), and Ada-Marie Walsh, Relig-
ious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Unconstitutional and
Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 189 (2001) (arguing that RLUIPA is invalid
under the Establishment Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause).
62. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
63. Id. at 2117.
64. Id. at 2121.
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of the land use provision. 65 Notwithstanding any other potential
arguments against the facial constitutionality of the land use pro-
vision, such as commerce and spending clause arguments, this ar-
ticle accepts the facial constitutionality of the entire statute. 66
The issue considered here is the interpretation of the substantial
burden test and its implication on the constitutionality of RLUIPA
as the statute is applied.
IV. CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR URBAN BELIEVERS V.
CITY OF CHICAGO
The plaintiffs in C.L. U.B. were an association of Chicago area
churches; the Civil Liberties for Urban Believers; and five individ-
ual member churches, which were directly impacted by Chicago's
zoning laws. 67 The defendant in C.L. U.B. was the City of Chicago.
The C.L. U.B. case raised the issue of whether Chicago's zoning
ordinance imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of the plaintiffs.68 Under Chicago's zoning laws in place at the
time the action was filed, zoning districts in the city consisted of
residential zones, business zones, commercial zones, and manu-
facturing zones.69 Most of the land available for development in
the city was zoned residential.70 Religious land uses were zoned
as-of-right 7' in residential districts and were designated as special
uses 72 in all business and commercial districts relevant to the
case. 73 Chicago's zoning ordinance required all special uses, re-
gardless of the nature of the use, to apply to the Zoning Board of
65. David L. Hudson, Jr., A Lower Bar to Religion Behind Bars: Religious Prac-
tice Law for Inmates; Path Cleared for Land Use Provision, available at http://www.
abanet.org/journal/ereport/jn3relig.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
66. Id.
67. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2003) (the five mem-
ber-church plaintiffs were Christ Center Church, Christian Bible Church, Mount Zion
Church, Christian Covenant Church, and His Word Church).
68. Id. at 760-61.
69. Id. at 755-59.
70. Id.
71. As-of-right use is defined as "a use of land that is permitted as a principal use
in a zoning district." JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE Au-
THORITY TO ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 446 (2001).
72. "Special uses are uses that, because of their widely varying land use and oper-
ational characteristics, require case-by-case review in order to determine whether
they will be compatible with surrounding uses and development patterns. Case-by-
case review is intended to ensure consideration of the special use's anticipated land
use, site design and operational impacts." CHI., ILL., ZONING ORDINANCE § 17-13-0901
(2004).
73. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 755-59.
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Appeals (hereinafter "ZBA") for a special use permit. 74 In the
midst of the litigation of this case, Chicago amended its zoning
laws in February 2000 to ensure that religious land uses and
other assembly-oriented land uses (such as clubs, meeting halls,
and lodges) were treated equally in business, commercial, and
manufacturing zones. 75 Additionally,
[the] amendments... (i) exempt[ed] churches from the require-
ment that a Special Use applicant affirmatively demonstrate
that the proposed use 'is necessary for the public convenience at
that location' and (ii) provide that a Special Use permit shall
automatically issue in the event that the ZBA fails to render a
decision within 120 days of the date of application. 76
The plaintiffs contended that Chicago's zoning laws violated
their rights under RLUIPA. 77 Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed
that the Chicago zoning laws violated their First Amendment
rights to free exercise of religion, speech, and assembly, and their
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due pro-
cess. 78 The five individual church plaintiffs in this case had sev-
eral attributes in common: Each of the five individual member
church plaintiffs were located in business or commercial zones
throughout Chicago; 79 each was denied a special use permit upon
application or rescinded their application for a special use permit
to operate a church because of community opposition;80 and each
74. Id.
75. Id. at 758.
76. Id.
77. Id. Actually, this case was filed before RLUIPA was signed into law by Presi-
dent Clinton in 2000. Initially, the case was filed under the RFRA which, as men-
tioned above, was struck down by the Court in the City of Boerne v. Flores. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). The appellant/plaintiffs amended their
complaint to remove their claim under RFRA when it was held unconstitutional as
applied to the states. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 758. When RLUIPA was signed into law,
the appellant/plaintiffs again amended their complaint to include a claim under
RLUIPA. Id.
78. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 763-68. The Seventh Circuit found each of C.L.U.B.'s
constitutional claims without merit and ruled in favor of the City of Chicago. Id. at
764-66.
79. Id. at 756-58 (Christ Center Church was located in a commercial district;
Christian Bible Church was located in a business district; Mount Zion Church was
located in a commercial district; Christian Covenant Church was located in a commer-
cial district; and His Word Church was located in a commercial district).
80. Id. at 756-57 (Christ Center Church was denied a special use permit; Chris-
tian Bible Church was denied a special use permit; Mount Zion Church withdrew its
application for a special use permit due to community opposition; Christian Covenant
Church was ordered to stop using leased space as a church and in turn decided not to
11
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had found a location in which they were permitted to operate a
church as a special use or as-of-right. 8'
The litigation in C.L.U.B. began in 1994, and a very long,
complex history with several decisions of the district court has
since ensued.8 2 The decision relevant to this casenote is the deci-
sion written by Judge Hibbler of the District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois on March 30, 2001.83 It was in this decision
that the district court considered the plaintiffs' RLUIPA claim for
the first time.8 4 On the plaintiffs' RLUIPA claim, the court easily
and with little discussion granted the city's motion for summary
judgment.8 5 In so doing, the court stated that RLUIPA was not
implicated in this case because the Chicago Zoning Ordinance as
amended did not impose a substantial burden on religious
exercise.8 6
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city and af-
firmed the determination of the district court.8 7 In affirming the
district court's grant of summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit
purchase the building out of fear that a special use permit would not be granted; and
His Word Church withdrew its application for a special use permit as a result of a
rezoning of the building where the church was leasing space).
81. Id. (Christ Center Church eventually obtained a special use permit and oper-
ates in a commercial district; Christian Bible Church obtained a special use permit
and operates in a business district; Mount Zion Church owns and meets at a church in
a commercial district; Christian Covenant Church owns and meets at a church in a
residential district where churches are allowed as-of-right; and His Word Church also
meets in a church which they own and operate in a residential district).
82. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, No. 94 C 6151, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2230 (N.D.
Ill. 1996), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Iglesia De La Biblia Abierta v. Banks, 129
F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, No. 97-1041, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34546 (7th
Cir. 1997), summary judgment granted sub nom. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 157 F.
Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2001), reconsideration denied, No. 94 C 6151, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5913 (N.D. Ill. 2002), affd, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003), reh'g en banc denied,
No. 01-4030, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24176 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1096
(2004).
83. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
84. Id. at 916-17. In this opinion, the court also dealt with the plaintiffs' Free
Exercise claim and held that Smith applied because the zoning ordinances were laws
of general application because they regulated the use of land, not religion. In light of
the determination that Smith applies, the court held that "the Zoning Ordinance and
related provisions are valid neutral and generally applicable zoning regulations that
impose no substantial burden on the free exercise of religion." Id. at 915.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 916-17.
87. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 768.
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articulated a standard for the substantial burden test under
RLUIPA.8 The court stated that:
[I]n the context of RLUIPA's broad definition of religious exer-
cise, a land-use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on
religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary,
and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exer-
cise-including the use of real property for the purpose thereof
within the regulation's jurisdiction generally-effectively
impracticable.8 9
By adopting this test, the Seventh Circuit rejected the broader
substantial burden test that it adopted when analyzing a claim
under RFRA.90 The court reasoned that RLUIPA's expansive
view with regard to religious exercise necessitates a narrower
reading of the substantial burden standard because applying a
more extensive definition of "substantial burden" would render
the word "substantial" meaningless. 91
The appellants argued that the high cost and scarcity of land
coupled with the process of obtaining a special use permit caused
a substantial burden on their religious exercise.92 The court re-
jected this argument and reasoned that the obstacles that the
plaintiffs cited were "incidental to any high-density urban land
use";93 therefore, religious land uses are on equal footing with
other uses allowed by special permit.94 The court went on to rea-
son that if RLUIPA was to apply in this case, it would favor relig-
ious land uses over other land uses allowed by special permit.95
Such favoritism could violate the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause. 96
88. Id. at 761.
89. Id.
90. Id. ("[Within the meaning of RFRA, a substantial burden on religious exer-
cise 'is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated
conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenant
of a person's religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to
those beliefs.'" (quoting Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated
on other grounds, 522 U.S. 801 (1997))).
91. Id. (the court reasoned that because the definition of religious exercise was so
expansive, a broad interpretation of substantial burden would cause any burden, no
matter how minor, to be "substantial").
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 762.
96. Id. at 761; see also Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d
183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004).
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V. CASES THAT FOLLOW AND CASES THAT
DEPART FROM THE SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
STANDARD ARTICULATED IN THE C.L. U.B.
CASE
Several courts have followed the restrictive view of the sub-
stantial burden standard, such as the Seventh Circuit's applica-
tion in the C.L. U.B. case,97 and several courts have departed from
the practical analysis of the Seventh Circuit.98 The cases ex-
tending the reasoning in C.L. U.B. recognize the practical implica-
tions on land use law and the Establishment Clause that flow
from an expansive view of the substantial burden standard under
RLUIPA.99 Those that diverge from the Seventh Circuit effec-
tively state that any land use law that burdens religion creates a
substantial burden that implicates RLUIPA. 1° °
A. Cases that Follow the Seventh Circuit's Substantial
Burden Standard
San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill10 1 is an ex-
ample of a case that follows the reasoning of the substantial bur-
den test articulated in C.L. U.B. In that case, San Jose Christian
College sought to change land originally dedicated for use as a
hospital in a planned unit development (PUD) to land associated
with the college.' 0 2 Initially, the school submitted a plan showing
a new gymnasium, playing fields, and a theatre/chapel that would
eventually accommodate 1200 students.10 3 When the city asked
97. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. City of W. Linn, 86 P.3d 1140, 1152-54
(Or. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing at length the Seventh Circuit's decision in C.L.U.B.
and subsequent decisions under RLUIPA that follow the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
in C.L.U.B., including San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024
(9th Cir. 2004)); see also Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of
Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see also Konikov v. Orange
County, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2004), affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 410 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005).
98. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 86 P.3d at 1154 (discussing at length the
Seventh Circuit's decision in C.L.U.B. and subsequent decisions under RLUIPA that
depart from the substantial burden standard articulated in C.L.U.B. including El-
sinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003));
see also Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Conn. 2001); see also
Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16397, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
2004).
99, See Konikov, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
100. Congregation Kol Ami, No. 01-1919, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16387, at *26-29.
101. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004).
102. Id. at 1027-28.
103. Id.
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for a more specific application detailing the college's plans, the col-
lege scaled back its plans to include only the use of current build-
ings for a population of 400 students.10 4 The city denied the
college's application because the college did not comply with the
city's application requirements.' 0 5 In response to the city's denial,
the college brought suit under, inter alia, RLUIPA.10 6 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Morgan Hill, holding
that RLUIPA was not "triggered" because the zoning law did not
impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. 10 7 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed and held that "for a land use regulation to impose
a 'substantial burden' it must be 'oppressive' and to a 'significantly
great' extent."108 In light of this interpretation, the court stated
that in this case the college "is simply adverse to complying with
the PUD ordinance requirements"; 0 9 and the city's requirement
that the college submit a complete application is not a burden on
religious exercise."1 0 The court went on to point out that the hold-
ing in this case is "entirely consistent with the Seventh Circuit's
recent ruling in [C.L. U.B.].""'
Following suit behind the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the
District Court for the Middle District of Florida adopted the Sev-
enth Circuit's approach to RLUIPA's substantial burden standard
in Konikov v. Orange County.'1 2 In Konikov, the plaintiff owned
land within an Orange County subdivision, which was zoned for
residential use.1 13 In Orange County, religious land uses were
permitted as-of-right in several districts; however in residential
districts, religious land uses were only permitted if special excep-
tion approval was obtained.'1 4 Several neighbors complained to
the local zoning enforcement agent that the plaintiff was operat-
ing a place of worship at his home without special exception ap-
proval.115 The Code Enforcement Board held a hearing and
decided that the plaintiff was, in fact, "operating a religious organ-
104. Id. at 1028-29.
105. Id. at 1029.
106. Id.
107. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, No. C01-20857(RMW), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23162, at *15 (N.D. Ca. 2001), affd, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004).
108. San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034.
109. Id. at 1035.
110. Id. at 1334-35.
111. Id.
112. Konikov v. Orange County, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
113. Id. at 1331-32.
114. Id. at 1332.
115. Id. at 1332-35.
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ization from a residential property without special exception ap-
proval and thus was in violation of [the zoning code]. '"116 Rather
than applying for special exception approval, the plaintiff filed
this action claiming that the county zoning ordinance violated, in-
ter alia, RLUIPA. 11 7 On the plaintiffs RLUIPA claim, the court
held that the protections of RLUIPA were not implicated because
the plaintiff was unable to show that the special use exception re-
quirement constituted a substantial burden under the statute.118
The court here fully adopted the substantial burden test and ratio-
nale of the Seventh Circuit in C.L. U.B., concluding that a broad
approach to the substantial burden standard would render the
word "substantial" meaningless. 119
Although the Second Circuit has not formally adopted an in-
terpretation of the substantial burden test under RLUIPA, the
case of Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck offers an
interesting discussion of RLUIPA.1 20 In that case, a religious
school brought suit against the Village of Mamaroneck alleging
that the village's denial of a special use permit for which the
school applied violated RLUIPA. 121 The school submitted an ap-
plication for a special use permit to the village to enable the school
to build additional buildings and improve existing buildings.1 22
Part of the improvements to the school would be used for secular
purposes and part of the improvements would be used for religious
purposes.1 23 The village, after a suit involving issues under New
York's State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), de-
nied the special use permit because of traffic and parking con-
cerns. 124 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, Westchester Day School, and ordered that the village
grant the plaintiff a special use permit.125 The district court rea-
soned that the denial of the special use permit did, in fact, impose
a substantial burden on religion because the present facilities lim-
ited the ability of the school's students to gather, pray, and be edu-
116. Id. at 1336.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1344.
119. Id.
120. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004).
121. Id. at 184-85.
122. Id. at 185.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 185-86.
125. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 243
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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cated. 126 In finding that the village's denial of the special use
permit did impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
the students at the school, the court went on to hold that the traf-
fic and parking concerns articulated by the village's Zoning Board
of Appeals were not sufficient to meet the compelling interest test
under RLUIPA. 127 Because the court did not find a compelling
state interest, the district court did not need to address the last
part of the RLUIPA standard-whether the village's action was
the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state inter-
est.1 28 Despite this finding, the court, in dicta, expressed doubt
that it would be able to find that the complete denial of the special
use permit would meet the least restrictive means standard. 129
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the
judgment, finding that summary judgment was not appropriate at
this stage of the lawsuit. 30 Furthermore, the Second Circuit com-
mented on the district court's interpretation of the substantial
burden test under RLUIPA.131 In so commenting, the Second Cir-
cuit expressed doubt that a substantial burden standard as broad
as the one applied by the district court, which, as mentioned
above, encompassed the religious and non-religious activities of
the school under the banner of religion because the school was a
religious school, would withstand an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge.' 32 The court reserved judgment on this issue here, but by
discussing RLUIPA's place in the narrow zone between the Estab-
lishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, hinted at the fact
that it would adopt a test similar to the test adopted in C.L. U.B. to
save RLUIPA from violating the Establishment Clause.133
To summarize, the C.L. U.B. case and the San Jose Christian
College case clearly articulate a substantial burden standard
under RLUIPA that will withstand Establishment Clause scru-
tiny under the Lemon test. 3 4 This logic, as we have seen, was
also adopted in the Konikov case.' 35 Finally, although not adopted
126. Id. at 241-42.
127. Id.
128. Id. at n.9.
129. Id.
130. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir.
2004).
131. Id. at 189.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 189-90.
134. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003); San Jose Chris-
tian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1045 (9th Cir. 2004).
135. Konikov v. Orange County, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
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by the Second Circuit in Westchester Day School, the court hinted
that the substantial burden test must impose a standard much
like that adopted in C.L. U.B., San Jose Christian College, and
Konikov to ensure that RLUIPA, as applied, is constitutional
under the Establishment Clause.136 The next section of this arti-
cle will examine the cases that have departed from the standard
articulated in C.L. U.B., and have imposed a more lenient form of
the substantial burden test under RLUIPA.
B. Cases that Depart from the Seventh Circuit's
Substantial Burden Standard
Contrary to the approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
C.L. U.B., in Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township,13 7 the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopted a broad interpretation
of the substantial burden test under RLUIPA. The defendant
there was Abington Township, Pennsylvania. Abington's zoning
laws did not allow religious land uses in R-1 zoning districts (resi-
dential districts) as-of-right or by special exception unless the Zon-
ing Hearing Board of Adjustments of Abington (ZHA) granted a
variance. 138 In Abington, religious land uses are allowed as-of-
right in CS districts (community service districts) and M districts
(mixed use districts). 39 Additionally, religious land uses are al-
lowed by special exception (which requires the owner to demon-
strate that the land use is consistent with the public interest
before it is approved), in A-O districts (apartment-office
districts). 140
The plaintiff in Congregation Kol Ami was a Reform Jewish
Synagogue that had been operating as a nonprofit corporation in
the Philadelphia area for approximately ten years.14 1 Plaintiff en-
tered into an agreement to purchase land in an R-1 zoning district
in Abington Township. 142 After entering into the agreement, the
plaintiff filed an application with the ZHA and requested a vari-
136. Westchester Day Sch., 386 F.3d at 189-90.
137. Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., No. 01-1919, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16397, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
138. Id. at *6. Although religious land uses and other land uses are not allowed as-
of-right or by special exception, parties interested in using the land for such purposes
may apply for variances within R-1 zoning district. Id. In order to be granted a vari-
ance, the applicant must show an unnecessary hardship, making the grant of a vari-
ance an exception rather than the normal course of events. Id.
139. Id. at *7.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *3.
142. Id. at *9.
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ance to build a temple that would facilitate "Shabbat services on
alternate Fridays and Saturdays, Hebrew classes on Wednesdays,
and religious classes for two hours on Sunday mornings." 143 The
ZHA denied the plaintiffs application for a variance to build the
synagogue finding that the plaintiff had not met the heavy burden
imposed by the variance standard. 144 Rather than filing an ap-
peal, plaintiffs brought an action seeking injunctive, declaratory,
and compensatory relief under, inter alia, RLUIPA by claiming
that the Abington zoning ordinance imposed a substantial burden
on the free exercise of religion. 145
Although the zoning ordinance did not impose a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion under traditional First
Amendment jurisprudence,146 the district court held that
"RLUIPA imposes a broad test for determining what is a substan-
tial burden." 47 Because the court found that the substantial bur-
den standard is broader under RLUIPA than under traditional
First Amendment jurisprudence, it held that the zoning ordinance
did impose a substantial burden on the plaintiffs free exercise.' 48
Although the court did not articulate a clear test for other courts
to follow when interpreting the substantial burden language of
RLUIPA, it reasoned that Congress intended the broad interpre-
tation of substantial burden because of the broad definition of re-
ligious exercise under the statute. 149 It then cited various cases
that held that municipal ordinances imposed a substantial burden
on the free exercise of the plaintiff. 50
The court further held that RLUIPA was constitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the Tenth
Amendment, and the Establishment Clause. 15' When analyzing
RLUIPA under the Establishment Clause, the court applied the
Lemon test.152 It held that RLUIPA does not violate the Estab-
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *10.
146. Id. at *13.
147. Id. at *25.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *26-27.
150. Id. at *26-29 (citing Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment
Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002); DiLaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp.,
30 F. App'x 501 (6th Cir. 2002); Murphy Zoning Comm'n v. Town of New Millford, 148
F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Conn. 2001)).
151. Id. at *26-50.
152. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (articulating the test to deter-
mine whether a law is violative of the Establishment Clause. The test consists of a
19
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lishment Clause because: (1) RLUIPA has a secular purpose,
namely "'to alleviate significant governmental interference with
the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their
religious missions'";153 (2) "RLUIPA does not have the primary ef-
fect of advancing religion,"15 4 (in other words, RLUIPA is neutral
toward religion because it simply alleviates the burden on relig-
ion); and (3) "RLUIPA does not create excessive [government] en-
tanglement with [religion.] " 155 If anything, RLUIPA lessens
government entanglement with religion because it explicitly de-
fines religious exercise, and local governments no longer need to
inquire whether an applicant's activity is "religious exercise"
under the First Amendment. 56
C. Practical Application of Each Standard
In its analysis, the court in Congregation Kol Ami failed to
realize the practical implications of its broad interpretation of the
substantial burden test on the second element of the Lemon test.
The practical implications of this expansive view were addressed
in C.L. U.B. and Westchester Day School. 57 As the Second Circuit
in Westchester Day School warned, a broad interpretation of the
substantial burden test could lead to the government favoring re-
ligious land uses over nonreligious land uses, which would run
afoul of the second prong of the Lemon test (the neutrality prong)
and the Establishment Clause.158 This is so because of the broad
definition of religious exercise under RLUIPA, which includes, for
three prong analysis and the law must pass each prong of the analysis. The three
prongs are (1) "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose"; (2) its "principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3) the
statute must not cause excessive government entanglement with religion) (citations
omitted).
153. Congregation Kol Ami, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16397, at *46 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)).
154. Id. at *46-47.
155. Id. at *48.
156. Id.
157. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761-62 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that
if the court exempted the plaintiff churches from the application requirements under
the zoning laws because they pose a substantial burden, RLUIPA would impermissi-
bly put religious land uses at an advantage over all other urban land uses); Westches-
ter Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004).
158. Westchester Day Sch., 386 F.3d at 189.
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example, the construction of a building.15 9 Because religious exer-
cise is defined so broadly, the following scenario illustrates the
constitutional problem that RLUIPA may face if the substantial
burden test is interpreted too broadly. 160
Both a religious school and a private, non-religious school
seek to add a library' 6 ' to the existing school. The physical condi-
tions of the schools and the land use laws that apply to the schools
are identical. The proposed library at each school exceeds the lot
coverage required by local zoning laws and, therefore, each school
is required to seek an area variance from the municipality in order
to add the library. Neither school qualifies for a variance under
the statute authorizing local government to grant variances.
Under a broad interpretation of the substantial burden test, such
as the interpretation applied in Congregation Kol Ami, the munic-
ipality would be required under RLUIPA to allow the religious
school to construct the library, while local land use laws would
prohibit the local government from granting an area variance to
the non-religious school. This unequal outcome is so because the
court in Congregation Kol Ami made it clear that essentially any
burden to the use of the land by a religious entity constituted a
substantial burden, thereby implicating RLUIPA.' 62 Clearly this
outcome violates the Establishment Clause because it gives the
religious land use an advantage over the secular land use rather
than simply placing the two uses on equal footing.
On the other hand, under the test applied by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in C.L. U.B. and the Ninth Circuit in San Jose Christian Col-
lege, RLUIPA would not be implicated by the hypothetical
situation described above because the court would not find a sub-
stantial burden. Under the test articulated by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the only "land-use regulation[s] that impose[ I a substantial
burden on religious exercise [are] one[s] that necessarily bear[]
direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering re-
159. "The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or
intends to use the property for that purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B).
160. See generally Westchester Day Sch., 386 F.3d at 189 (establishing the basic
premise for the hypothetical illustration in this paper); see also Walsh, supra note 61,
at 205 (putting forth a similar hypothetical situation to demonstrate the potential
Establishment Clause issue facing RLUIPA).
161. For the purpose of this illustration, the author assumes that the library at the
religious school will be used for secular purposes.
162. Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., No. 01-1919, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16397, at *26-29 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
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ligious exercise-including the use of real property for the purpose
thereof within the regulated jurisdiction generally-effectively
impracticable." 163 Under the assumed scenario, the fact that zon-
ing laws do not allow the school to build a secular library does not
render the use of the land "effectively impracticable" for religious
exercise. Therefore, RLUIPA would not be implicated. RLUIPA
would be available to the religious school, however, if it could not
carry out the function of religious education in the building as it
was currently situated and there was no other feasible location for
the school, thereby rendering religious exercise effectively
impractical.
The hypothetical illustration above clearly shows that a nar-
row view of the substantial burden test is in the best interest of
local land use authorities and religious entities. The narrow view
allows local land use authorities to plan and zone in the best inter-
est of the residents and the community, while offering protection
to the religious land use from exclusionary zoning under the guise
of some legitimate purpose. In the end, the narrow view offers
more protection to religious entities than the broad view. The
broad interpretation will inevitably violate the Establishment
Clause, leaving religious entities with no strict scrutiny protection
unless they present a hybrid claim or can show that the law is not
a neutral law of general applicability.16 4
D. Issues and Concerns Raised by RLUIPA Beyond the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause
It is worth mentioning that beyond the constraints of the
First Amendment, there are other concerns arising out of a broad
interpretation of RLUIPA. One major concern is the advent of the
"megachurch."1 65 "'Megachurches' are defined as churches [or any
other religious establishment with similar characteristics] with
congregations over 2,000 that provide a multitude of services
outside of the traditional Sunday service."'1 66 Because of the large
congregation, numerous services, and the large physical size of the
church, congregations find it easiest to establish megachurches in
163. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
164. Id. at 761-62; Westchester Day Sch., 386 F.3d at 189.
165. For a comprehensive discussion of RLUIPA and megachurches, see Jonathan
D. Weiss & Randy Lowell, Supersizing Religion: Megachurches, Sprawl, and Smart
Growth, 21 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 313 (2002). See also David B. Zucco, Note,
Super-sized with Fries: Regulation Religious Land Use in the Era of Megachurches, 88
MiNN. L. REV. 416 (2003).
166. Weiss & Lowell, supra note 165, at 314.
284 [Vol. 23
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss1/10
2005-20061 CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR URBAN BELIEVERS 285
suburban or exurban areas. 167 Additionally, megachurches are
usually developed in residential areas.168
While megachurches provide positive community environ-
ments for their members, they can pose problems for surrounding
communities.1 69 Megachurches, as noted above, go beyond Sun-
day services; and can include "day care facilities, athletic fields,
classrooms, hotels, convention centers, skate parks, restaurants,
... bookstores, gyms, and dormitories."1 70 One megachurch, the
Brentwood Baptist Church in Houston, Texas, even includes a Mc-
Donald's restaurant. 71 These accessory services may prove to be
problematic from a land use and land planning perspective, if
RLUIPA is applied in a broad manner. Under the broad interpre-
tation of the substantial burden standard set forth in Congrega-
tion Kol Ami, the above-listed activities, such as restaurants,
hotels, and convention centers, could find their way into residen-
tial neighborhoods because they would be protected by
RLUIPA. 172 This would have a detrimental effect on neighbors,
municipalities, and the environment by greatly increasing noise,
traffic, stormwater runoff due to increased ground coverage, and a
decline in commercial districts. 73 One author argues that the so-
lution to this problem is to zone megachurches absolutely in non-
residential areas.174 However, this practical solution could prove
unworkable if the broad interpretation of RLUIPA is adopted be-
cause the laws excluding megachurches from residential areas
will likely be seen as imposing a substantial burden and be struck
down, thereby subjecting municipalities to the negative effects
mentioned above. If courts would adopt the narrow view of
RLUIPA, however, municipalities would be permitted to restrict
megachurches to non-residential areas because, as long as the
church has a place to establish in the community, the zoning law
would not pose a substantial burden. 175 Again, enforcing RLUIPA
in this respect will protect the rights of the church by ensuring
that it is not entirely and invidiously excluded from a municipality
167. Id.
168. Id. at 317.
169. Id. at 316.
170. Id. at 317.
171. Patricia Leigh Brown, Megachurches as Minitowns, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002,
at Fl.
172. See generally Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., No. 01-1919, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16397, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
173. See Weiss & Lowell, supra note 165.
174. Zucco, supra note 165.
175. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
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in which it wishes to serve its members. This approach will also
protect the integrity of municipal land use laws and the broader
community from the detrimental environmental impacts of
sprawl.
A second concern is the manner in which courts will construe
the definition of land use regulation under RLUIPA. As noted
above, RLUIPA defines the term "land use regulation" as "a zon-
ing or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that lim-
its or restricts a claimant's use or development of land .... ,"176
The question then becomes whether building codes, infrastructure
provisions, local environmental laws, and other similar types of
local laws relating to the use of land will be construed as zoning
laws. 177 This is an important issue because these types of regula-
tions directly impact the heath and safety of all members of a com-
munity. To date, few claims have been brought which ask the
court to define the contours of the statutory definition of land use
regulations. However, the Third Circuit recently considered such
a case. 178 In Second Baptist Church v. Gilpin Township, the town-
ship passed an ordinance that required all building within 150
feet of a sewer line to "tap-in" to the sewer system. 179 After ex-
tending the town sewer line to within 138 feet of the plaintiff-
church's property, the township notified the church that they
would be required to "tap-in" to the sewer system.180 The church
refused to comply, arguing that the burden imposed on the church
was too great and brought this action under, inter alia,
RLUIPA.18 1 The Third Circuit, affirming the district court's judg-
ment granting the township's motion to dismiss the RLUIPA
claim, held that the mandatory "tap-in" ordinance was not a zon-
ing law, and therefore RLUIPA was not implicated. 8 2 Other
courts faced with similar challenges should follow the plain lan-
guage interpretation of RLUIPA articulated by the Third Circuit
in Second Baptist Church.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).
177. Walsh, supra note 61, at 197. (Although this article does not discuss in detail
the implications of RLUIPA beyond traditional zoning laws, it does suggest that a
broad interpretation of RLUIPA may call into question the validity of fire, safety, and
health regulations as applied to religious land uses.)
178. Second Baptist Church v. Gilpin Twp., No. 04-1434, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
26858, at *1 (3d Cir. 2004).
179. Id. at *3.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *6-7.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In enacting RLUIPA, Congress sought to "'remedy the well
documented discriminatory and abusive treatment suffered by re-
ligious individuals and organizations in the land use context"' 18 3
by ensuring that religious land uses would not be intentionally
zoned out of our cities and towns. If RLUIPA is to protect these
precious rights, it seems obvious that the restrictive view of the
substantial burden test is required. By adopting the narrow inter-
pretation of the substantial burden test, clearly articulated by the
Seventh Circuit in C.L.U.B. and adopted by San Jose Christian
College and Konikov, local land use laws and religious land uses
are provided with the proper level of protection. Religious persons
and institutions are protected by the narrow interpretation of the
substantial burden test because it limits the chance that RLUIPA
will violate the Establishment Clause in an as-applied challenge.
Moreover, local governments are assured that the local zoning or-
dinances they pass will be carried out in accordance with their
comprehensive plan for the benefit of the residents of the munici-
pality. Citizens and congregation members, who are often one and
the same, will be served because the comprehensive plan adopted
by their local legislature to encourage appropriate development
and conservation, and the zoning laws enacted to achieve those
ends, will be upheld. Thus, citizens and congregation members
will have a place to worship.
183. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186,
1193 (D. Wyo. 2002) (quoting RLUIPA's Legislative History, 146 CONG. REC. E. 1234,
1235 (July 14, 2000)).
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